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Abstract There is little consensus about the characteris-
tics and number of body representations in the brain. In the
present paper, we examine the main problems that are
encountered when trying to dissociate multiple body rep-
resentations in healthy individuals with the use of bodily
illusions. Traditionally, task-dependent bodily illusion
effects have been taken as evidence for dissociable
underlying body representations. Although this reasoning
holds well when the dissociation is made between different
types of tasks that are closely linked to different body
representations, it becomes problematic when found within
the same response task (i.e., within the same type of rep-
resentation). Hence, this experimental approach to inves-
tigating body representations runs the risk of identifying as
many different body representations as there are signiﬁ-
cantly different experimental outputs. Here, we discuss and
illustrate a different approach to this pluralism by shifting
the focus towards investigating task-dependency of illusion
outputs in combination with the type of multisensory input.
Finally, we present two examples of behavioural bodily
illusion experiments and apply Bayesian model selection to
illustrate how this different approach of dissociating and
classifying multiple body representations can be applied.
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Introduction
There has been little consensus on the nature and number
of body representations. The main focus of this paper is
neither to settle the debate in favour of one view over the
other, nor to count how many body representations there
are. Instead, the present paper tries to combine the different
conceptual and experimental approaches to this topic into a
more holistic view. In part one, we discuss two speciﬁc
problems that have been encountered while dissociating
multiple body representations in healthy individuals with
the use of bodily illusions. In part two, we propose a dif-
ferent approach that might overcome these two main
problems. In the last part, we discuss two example datasets
of bodily illusion experiments, which serve as a technical
illustration. We re-evaluate and reanalyze previously pub-
lished rubber hand illusion data, which provide a good
example of the two main problems. So instead of asking
how many body representations can be dissociated purely
based on experimental output, we identify different tenta-
tive models of the possible weighting of the multisensory
input in the example bodily illusion experiment, and test
these against each other directly using Bayesian model
selection. This provides a possible way to avoid the prob-
lems recently encountered when dissociating multiple body
representations in healthy individuals with the use of
bodily illusions.
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The way the body is mentally represented has been inves-
tigated by many different ﬁelds of research. For example,
neuropsychologists have investigated patients with impair-
ments in mentally representing and/or acting with the body,
philosophers have explored the phenomenology of our
bodily experiences and our conscious bodily self, experi-
mental psychologists have studied multimodal integration
with bodily illusions, and neuroscientists have tried to ﬁnd
the neural correlates of our mental body representation.
However, there is no consensus on the number, deﬁnitions
and/or characteristics of body representations. There are
currently two main psychological and philosophical models
of body representations: (a) a dual model of body repre-
sentation distinguishing the body image and the body
schema (Gallagher and Cole 1995; Rossetti et al. 1995;
Paillard 1999; Dijkerman and De Haan 2007) or short-term
and long-term body representations (O’Shaughnessy 1995;
Carruthers 2008), and (b) a triadic model of body repre-
sentation that makes a more ﬁne-grained distinction
between a visuo-spatial body map and body semantics
within the body image, in addition to the body schema
(Schwoebel and Coslett 2005; Buxbaum and Coslett 2001).
The ﬁrst main problem that current models of body
representations encounter when tested experimentally is
conceptual. The distinctions between body representations
are often made on a single dimension, such as availability
to consciousness (Gallagher 2005), temporal dynamicity
(O’Shaughnessy 1995), or functional role (Paillard 1999).
Depending on the criterion, different distinctions are pos-
sible, leading to widespread confusion (de Vignemont
2007). Even more importantly, there are more dimensions
on which body representations can be dissociated than the
three highlighted above, such as the relative importance of
different bodily sensory input signals, the spatial frame of
reference, etc. For example, the body schema most prob-
ably includes short-term information (e.g., body posture) as
well as long-term information (e.g., the size of the limbs),
both self-speciﬁc information (e.g., strength) and human-
speciﬁc information (e.g., degrees of freedom of the joints).
By contrast, when investigating the body image one needs
to try to group together the heterogeneous concepts of body
percept, body concept and body affect in the dual model
(Gallagher and Cole 1995). Although the triadic model
does attempt to split the body image up into two compo-
nents (the structural description and semantic knowledge),
how and where do we implement the body affect? Should
we postulate a fourth type of body representation?
The second problem that one encounters is the nature of
the evidence that current models of body representations
rely upon. Neuropsychology has been the main starting
point for investigating mental body representations,
whereby Head and Holmes (1911–1912) were among the
ﬁrst to describe several patients with dissociable deﬁcits
concerning the representation, localization and sensation of
the body. However, because there is disagreement on the
number and deﬁnitions of body representations, there is
also disagreement on the classiﬁcation of bodily disorders.
For example, personal neglect is interpreted both as a
deﬁcit of body schema (Coslett 1998) and as a deﬁcit of
body image (Gallagher 2005), whereas Kinsbourne (1995)
argued that it is due to an attentional impairment, and not to
a representational impairment. The problem here is that
most classiﬁcations of body representations rely primarily
on a very heterogeneous group of neuropsychological
disorders that can be divided or classiﬁed on a number of
different levels (for an extended discussion, see de Vig-
nemont (2009).
Attempts to classify multiple body representations in
healthy individuals also run into several problems. The
general approach holds that the experimenter induces a
sensory conﬂict which often results in some form of
bodily illusion. This sensory conﬂict can be evoked
within a unimodal information source (for example,
illusions due to tendon vibration—described below in
more detail (Kammers et al. 2006; Lackner 1988)) or
between multisensory sources (for example the rubber
hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen 1998) and mirror
illusion (Holmes et al. 2006)). If the response to the
bodily illusion is sensitive to the context or to the type of
task, then this is often taken as evidence for the
involvement of distinct types of body representations. In
other words, when signiﬁcantly different responses to the
same sensory conﬂict/bodily illusion can be identiﬁed,
these distinct responses are taken to be subserved by
dissociable body representations. An example of an illu-
sion which induces unimodal conﬂict is the kinaesthetic
tendon vibration illusion. Vibration of a tendon induces
an illusory displacement of a static limb by inﬂuencing
the afferent muscle spindles (de Vignemont et al. 2005;
Kammers et al. 2006; Lackner and Taublieb 1983).
Lackner and Taublieb (1983) showed that consciously
perceived limb position depends not only on afferent and
efferent information about individual limbs in isolation,
but also on the spatial conﬁguration of the entire body.
More recently, it was shown that a perceptual matching
task (to test the body image) was signiﬁcantly more
affected by this vibrotactile illusion than an action
reaching response (to test the body schema) towards the
perceived location of the index ﬁnger of the vibrated arm
(Kammers et al. 2006). This shows that the weighting of
the information from the vibrated muscle might depend
on the kind of output that is required, i.e., the type of
task, which was taken as evidence for dissociable
underlying body representations.
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type of task is controversial as well. There is no consensus
on how each body representation can best be experimen-
tally tested (whether in healthy individuals or patients). For
example, matching of a body part’s illusory orientation can
be taken as a perceptual response, which would be a way to
investigate the body image in the dual model. By contrast,
it would most likely be a measurement of the body schema
in the triadic model since it involves active muscle
movement. Furthermore, for the triadic model, semantics
should be included in the task to tap into the body image.
This diversity illustrates the main problem when trying to
dissociate and classify multiple body representations in
healthy individuals, the risk of identifying as many body
representations as there are tentative classiﬁcations or
signiﬁcantly different experimental outputs.
A last and important example of this plurality is the
range of body representations that can be identiﬁed with
the rubber hand illusion (RHI). The RHI is evoked when
the participant watches a rubber hand being stroked, while
their own unseen hand is stroked in synchrony. This results
in feeling ownership over the rubber hand and induces a
relocation of the perceived location of one’s unseen own
hand towards the location of the rubber hand (Botvinick
and Cohen 1998). Feeling of ownership over the rubber
hand is often measured with a standard questionnaire
(Botvinick and Cohen 1998). A psychometric approach
using a more extensive questionnaire showed that the
illusion induces different components of embodiment after
synchronous versus asynchronous stroking indicating that
both stimulations might induce different bodily experi-
ences (Longo et al. 2008).
Asynchronous stroking is often applied as a standard
control, which not only shows reduced feeling of owner-
ship, but also shows a smaller relocation of the partici-
pant’s own unseen hand towards the seen rubber hand
compared to synchronous stroking (Botvinick and Cohen
1998; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005). Interestingly, the pro-
prioceptive drift has even been found without any tactile
feedback (Holmes et al. 2006). With use of the mirror
illusion (where the rubber hand is replaced by the mirror
image of the participant’s own hand) Holmes et al. (2006)
showed that no tactile feedback has a differential effect on
the perceived relocation of the hand compared to asyn-
chronous feedback. They showed that asynchronous feed-
back (tapping of the ﬁnger) in the mirror illusion
signiﬁcantly decreases the proprioceptive drift compared to
no tactile feedback. For the RHI it remains somewhat
unclear whether the synchronous stroking increases the
proprioceptive drift or whether the asynchronous stroking
decreases the proprioceptive drift. Nevertheless, the dif-
ference between the two is taken as a measure of
embodiment of the (location) of the rubber hand.
The illusion-induced discrepancy in perceived hand
location is often measured with a perceptual localization
task (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard
2005). Relocation of the perceived location of the partici-
pant’s own hand has now been shown to depend on the
task. Although perceptual location judgments of the par-
ticipant’s own hand were illusion-sensitive, ballistic
actions with as well as towards the illuded hand proved
robust against the illusion (Kammers et al. 2009a, b). We
interpreted this task dependency as evidence for different
dissociable underlying body representations, namely the
body schema for action and the body image for perception.
This was in line with the dual model of body representa-
tions. However, this distinction was primarily based on the
illusion sensitivity of the body image versus the illusion
robustness of the body schema. The interpretation of the
body representation used for action became more compli-
cated when we later showed that the robustness of motor
responses against bodily illusions seems to be dependent on
the exact type of motor task, as well as on the induction
method of the illusion. More speciﬁcally, when the rubber
hand illusion was induced not just on the index ﬁnger but
on the whole grasping conﬁguration of the hand (i.e.,
stroking on the index ﬁnger and thumb), the kinematic
parameters of a grasping movement were affected by the
RHI (Kammers et al. 2009).
Consequently, the main concern that one might have
with the current approach, in healthy individuals espe-
cially, is its focus of interest. The dual and the triadic
model are mainly interested in the ﬁnal output of bodily
information processing, and this is where they disagree.
This focus on body representations per se is at the expense
of the investigation of the building up of those body rep-
resentations. Let us not assume the existence of multiple
types of body representations in healthy individuals, on the
basis of a heterogeneous group of syndromes, and try to
avoid the pitfall of simply enumerating different repre-
sentations on the basis of dissociable output, without also
looking at the type of input and the interplay between the
two. Therefore, instead of introducing yet another disso-
ciation within the body representation(s) models, here we
present a different view, focusing on the principles gov-
erning the construction of the body representations that are
dependent on both available input and output.
A new approach
Two main problems in dissociating multiple body repre-
sentations in healthy individuals with the use of bodily
illusions are: (1) a disproportionate focus on output (i.e.,
task dependency) and (2) a failure to bring consensus to the
current discussion between different body representation
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123models. Alternatively, we suggest: (i) looking not only at
the output but also at the type of input and the interplay
between the two and (ii) to address and identify different
models before conducting an experiment and then testing
them directly and objectively against each other. The latter
can be done on different levels, for example input, output
or the different theoretical models on the number of body
representations. Here, we propose Bayesian selection as a
method to objectively test different models against each
other simultaneously. The Bayes factor is a statistical
measure that can be used to calculate the posterior model
probability of a model. This quantity reﬂects the proba-
bility that the model is correct given the data. (For an
introduction to Bayesian data analysis, see for instance,
Gelman et al. (2004). Kass and Raftery (1995) provide a
thorough overview of the properties of the Bayes factor as
a model selection criterion.)
Why use Bayesian model selection as a tool to over-
come the problems identiﬁed here? Application of the
Bayes factor for this purpose has certain advantages in
comparison to conventional null hypothesis testing. First,
instead of having to compare each model of interest with
the null model (or null hypothesis), the Bayes factor allows
us to directly compare several models against each other.
Second, this comparison of models does not result in the
normal loss of power, due to multiple comparisons,
because all relationships between the parameters in a
model are simultaneously evaluated. Third, the Bayes
factor has a naturally incorporated ‘‘Occam’s razor’’, which
means that when two models explain the data equally well,
the Bayes factor prefers the simpler model. These beneﬁts
are especially interesting for the problem of the indeﬁnite
number of body representations identiﬁed here. First, the
null model would be that there is no constraint of any body
representation. So you could either say that this means that
there is only a single body representation, or say that there
is no body representation underlying the different respon-
ses at all. The other models would be, for example, the
Dual model and Triadic model as well as perhaps a Quartic
model (Sirigu et al. 1991). In the experimental design there
should at least be as many different response types as there
are possible body representations based on the most com-
plex model. In this case, four different tasks to tap into the
possible four different body representations. For example, a
semantic task, a ballistic motor task, a purely perceptual
localization task, a matching task, etc. Next, data can be
collected and models can be tested in one single experi-
ment, to evaluate which of these models best explain the
data. In other words, this would answer the question
whether we need two, three or four body representations to
explain different effects of a bodily illusion on different
type of tasks. This can potentially lead to more consensus
within the body representation literature and to less isolated
experiments. Next, we will provide a detailed and more
technical example of the application of Bayesian model
selection for this purpose.
Two rubber hand illusion experiments as a technical
illustration
To illustrate the more technical application of this
approach, we discuss two RHI experiments in detail. The
RHI depends on the temporal correlation between visual
and tactile stimulation (i.e., stroking), in which the dis-
crepancy in location is overcome by ‘‘visual capture’’ of
the tactile sensation, resulting in a feeling of ownership
over the rubber hand and an illusory shift in the perceived
location of the subject’s own hand towards the location of
the rubber hand. The standard control condition involves
asynchronous stimulation of the rubber hand and the sub-
ject’s own hand (Botvinick and Cohen 1998). An asyn-
chronous stimulation, compared to synchronous
stimulation, results in less feeling of ownership over the
rubber hand and a smaller relocation of the subject’s own
occluded hand towards the visible rubber hand. First, we
will discuss an imaginary dataset based on the standard
way of investigating the effect of a bodily illusion on only a
single type of response. Example 1 does therefore not
address the issue of relating multiple responses to multiple
body representations, but provides a simple example
demonstrating that the proposed approach can be admin-
istered on different levels to investigate bodily illusions
and body representations. Second, in Example 2 we discuss
a more complicated, previously published RHI design,
showing how the approach can deal with the conceptual
implications of different perceived locations within one
type of response (Kammers et al. 2009a).
In both examples we transformed different possible
ways of integrating the RHI-induced conﬂict between
multisensory information sources into inequality and
equality constrained models. Subsequently, a Bayesian
model selection criterion, i.e., the Bayes factor, will be
used to investigate which tentative model (or models) of
sensory integration can best describe the different per-
ceived body locations.
Bayesian model selection: Example 1
In this ﬁrst example we use an imaginary RHI dataset based
on what has been frequently reported (e.g., Botvinick and
Cohen 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005). Five imaginary
participants gave a perceptual judgment of the perceived
location of their stimulated limb after either synchronous
stroking (RHI illusion condition) or asynchronous stroking
(RHI control condition). In this simpliﬁed version of an
336 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:333–342
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chronicity of tactile stimulation. More precisely we will
look at the mean response errors after synchronous versus
asynchronous stroking to investigate the effect of the RHI
(Table 1).
This relocation error provides insight into the underlying
relative weighting of visual and proprioceptive informa-
tion. It is already known that accurate limb localization is
based in general on the multimodal combination of visual
and proprioceptive information (Desmurget et al. 1995;
Graziano 1999; Graziano and Botvinick 2002). Several
models have been proposed to account for this difference in
multisensory weighting depending on the task demands
(Deneve and Pouget 2004; Ernst and Banks 2002; Scheidt
et al. 2005; van Beers et al. 1998, 1999, 2002). Although
these models differ in the way multisensory information is
integrated, they all agree that the objective of this inte-
gration/weighting is to reduce uncertainty and create an
accurate (consistent) localization of the limb. A wide range
of studies suggest that the relative weights that are given to
both information sources seem to depend on a range of
factors. For instance, the weighting seems to alter between
different spatial directions (van Beers et al. 2002), which
remains true even during illusory induced reaching errors
(Snijders et al. 2007). Furthermore, different locations of
the hand with respect to the body (Rossetti et al. 1994), and
even illumination conditions of the hand and the visual
background (Mon-Williams et al. 1997) can modify the
relative weight given to vision and proprioception. Addi-
tionally, when looking at movements, the relative weight-
ing seems to differ for the trajectory of the action versus the
end point of a movement (Scheidt et al. 2005).
Model speciﬁcation
We denote by l the mean of the induced relocation of the
illuded hand. In other words, this number represents the
mean error between the perceived and the veridical loca-
tion of the subject’s own hand in centimeters. From this
number the relative weight of vision and proprioception
can be derived. Complete visual dominance would result in
a l equal to the distance between the rubber hand and the
subject’s own hand. By contrast, complete proprioceptive
dominance would result in a l of zero. In that case there
would be no error between the perceived and the veridical
location of the subject’s own hand.
In this ﬁrst example we test two very simple models. We
consider the inequality constrained model M1: l1[l2
(which states that there is an illusory relocation after syn-
chronous stroking), this would results in a larger error
towards the location of the rubber hand compared to the
location error after asynchronous stroking. In terms of
multisensory integration this means that the weight of
visual information of the rubber hand is weighted more
strongly after synchronous stroking compared to asyn-
chronous stroking. Or conversely proprioception is
weighted more strongly after asynchronous stroking com-
pared to synchronous stroking.
This model will be tested against the unconstrained
model M0: l1, l2, which does not make any assumptions
about the weighting of vision and proprioception, that is, l1
and l2 can have any combination of values.
Bayes factor
The Bayes factor, which is denoted by Bji, is a model
selection criterion that provides the amount of evidence in
the data in favour of model Mj against model Mi.I f
B10[1, then model M1 receives more evidence from the
data than model M0. For example, if B10 = 3.0, there is
three times more evidence in the data in favor of model M1
in comparison to model M0. Note that this is equivalent to
B01 = 0.33.
When selecting between the inequality constrained
model (M1: l1[l2) versus the unconstrained model
(M0: l1, l2) based on the hypothetical data in Table 1, the
Bayes factor can be calculated using the encompassing
prior approach discussed by Klugkist et al. (2005). This
methodology was generalized to address the multivariate
normal model by Mulder et al. (2009).
First, a prior distribution must be speciﬁed for the model
parameters (l1, l2) under the unconstrained model M0.
This prior is also referred to as the encompassing prior. The
prior distribution represents the knowledge we have about
the model parameters before observing the data. We
assume vague (noninformative), independent, and identi-
cally distributed priors for l1 and l2 so that the prior dis-
tribution is dominated by the data. Figure 1 displays a
contour plot of this prior (dashed lines).
When updating our knowledge about (l1, l2) using the
data in Table 1, we obtain the posterior distribution of
(l1, l2), which represents our knowledge about (l1, l2)
after observing the data. For this data set, the posterior
Table 1 Illustrative data set of ﬁve participants
Participant x1 (response error
in cm after
synchronous stroking)
x2 (response error
in cm after
asynchronous stroking)
1 5.0 1.0
2 2.0 1.0
3 1.0 2.0
4 4.0 0.0
5 3.0 3.0
Mean 3.0 1.4
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displayed in Fig. 1.
Note that the posterior variances of l1 and l2 are smaller
than the prior variances as can be seen by the smaller radius
of the contours of the posterior in Fig. 1. This is a conse-
quence of the posterior containing more information about
l1 and l2 than the prior.
According to the encompassing prior approach, the
Bayes factor B10 of model M1 versus model M0 is given by:
B10 ¼
posterior proportion satisfying l1[l2
prior proportion satisfying l1[l2
¼
0:97
0:5
¼ 1:94
Hence, model M1 is almost two times better than model M0
at explaining the observed data. Therefore, the model that
assumes a larger error towards the rubber hand after syn-
chronous stroking (l1[l2) should be preferred over the
unconstrained model (l1, l2 unconstrained) given the data
in Table 1. In terms of multisensory integration this means
that visual information is relatively more strongly weighted
after synchronous stroking compared to asynchronous
stroking.
The Bayes factor can be used to calculate posterior
model probabilities, denoted by p(Mi|X), which reﬂect the
probability that model Mi is correct given the data X and
the other models under evaluation. In this example, the
posterior model probability of M1 is calculated according
to:
pðM1jXÞ¼
B10
B11 þ B10
¼
1:94
1 þ 1:94
¼ 0:66
Similarly, the posterior model probability of the uncon-
strained model is p(M0|X) = 0.34.
Bayesian model selection: Example 2
In this second example we use an existing dataset
(Kammers et al. 2009a) that exempliﬁes the main pitfall of
the premise that all signiﬁcantly different types of output
are subserved by dissociable body representations. In this
experiment, we applied the RHI paradigm and measured its
effect on different types of responses to investigate possi-
ble dissociable body representations. Subject’s own
occluded right index ﬁnger and the visible index ﬁnger of
the rubber hand were stroked either synchronously (illusion
condition) or asynchronously (control condition). After this
stimulation period, one of ﬁve perceptual localization
responses was collected.
The perceptual response was a matching judgment in
which the subject verbally indicated when the experi-
menter’s left index ﬁnger on top of the framework mirrored
the perceived location of the subject’s own right index
ﬁnger inside the framework. Perceptual response 1 was
asked immediately after the RHI induction.
The perceptual responses 2 through 5 were all conducted
after two action responses. In these cases there was ﬁrst the
stimulation period, next two pointing responses and ﬁnally
a perceptual response. A pointing response could be con-
ducted either with the illuded hand towards the location of
the tip of the index ﬁnger of the non-illuded hand, or vice
versa. All pointing movements were done inside the
framework out of view. The pointing hand landed on a
Plexiglas pane placed above the target hand so no cues
about pointing accuracy were provided.
Perceptual response 2 was given after the subject poin-
ted twice with the non-illuded hand towards the perceived
location of the index ﬁnger of the illuded hand. Perceptual
response 3 was conducted after a pointing movement ﬁrst
with the illuded hand towards the non-illuded hand and
next with the non-illuded hand towards the illuded hand.
Perceptual response 4 was identical to perceptual response
3, except that the order of the two previous pointing
movements was reversed. Finally, perceptual response 5
was preceded by two pointing movements with the illuded
hand.
Our conventional line of reasoning holds that if the
perceived location of the illuded hand measured with
response X signiﬁcantly differs from the perceived loca-
tion of the illuded hand with response Y, then X and Y
must be based on different underlying body representa-
tions (Kammers et al. 2006). This line of reasoning works
relatively well if we administer qualitatively different
tasks, such as actions (body schema) versus perceptual
localization tasks (body image). However, this reasoning
introduces the risk of becoming redundant when we ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly different perceived locations for response
X1, X2, X3 etc., like we do for the perceptual responses
Fig. 1 Sketch of contour plots of prior and posterior densities based
on the data of Table 1. The complete square can be interpreted as the
unconstrained space of M0 and the grey area can be interpreted as the
inequality constrained space of M1. The proportion of the prior
satisfying l1[l2 is 0.5. The proportion of the posterior satisfying
l1[l2 is 0.97. Note that the prior distribution is broad and vague,
whilst the posterior distribution is narrower and centred on the means
in the empirical data
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speaking this could be interpreted as evidence for three
different body images. Therefore, in this case, investi-
gating the underlying multisensory integration processes
in more detail might be more informative than simply
proposing numerous dissociable body representations/
images. Here, we investigate whether the difference in
magnitude between these perceptual judgments can be
explained by differences in the weighting of information
depending on both the availability and quantity of more
up to date proprioceptive information when visual infor-
mation is no longer directly available. In this way, dis-
sociable perceived locations for the different perceptual
responses do not necessarily need to be explained by
distinct multiple underlying body representations.
Model speciﬁcation
We identiﬁed the following two important aspects which
might have affected the relative weighting of visual and
proprioceptive information: (1) the available (multi)sen-
sory information and (2) the precision of each mode of
information (for example, vision has proven to be more
precise than proprioception in certain cases).
In the present example, new proprioceptive information
about the location of the illuded hand is only available for
Perceptual responses 3, 4, and 5. The amount of infor-
mation was the same for responses 3 and 4, but doubled
for response 5. For perceptual response 2 there is no new
proprioceptive information of the illuded hand and the
visual information is older than during perceptual
response 1 which may or may not affect its relative
weight.
Subsequently, we identiﬁed three different possible
tentative weighting models, which might explain the plu-
rality of dissociable perceived locations of the same limb
for the same type of task (perceptual matching as a means
to measure the body image) in this experiment.
M1—equality model. The location of the illuded hand is
the result of a speciﬁc relative weighting between vision
and proprioception that is equal across all conditions. In
other words is unaffected by the amount of new
proprioceptive information, which would thus result in
the same localization error for all perceptual responses.
M2—availability model. The location of the illuded hand
is unaffected by the amount of new proprioceptive
information. However, when new proprioceptive infor-
mation is provided the relative weight of visual informa-
tion is reduced. This would result in similar localization
error for perceptual responses 3, 4, and 5 which would be
smaller than the relocation error found for perceptual
responses 1 and 2.
M3—quantitative model. The location of the illuded
hand is inﬂuenced by the presence as well as the quantity
of more up to date proprioceptive information. In other
words, the perceived location of the hand is not only
inﬂuenced by movement of the illuded hand but also by
the number of movements that are made before the
perceptual response is given. This would result in
diminishing relocation errors between 3, 4 versus 5.
We translate these hypotheses into constrained statistical
models. To that end, we ﬁrst subtract the strength of the
RHI (illusion minus control condition) for each perceptual
judgment so that we obtain ﬁve measurements of each
subject.
Bayes factor
Response errors for 14 subjects in all 5 conditions are
displayed in Table 2.
These ﬁve measurements were modeled with a multi-
variate normal distribution N(l, R) where l is a vector of
length 5 containing the means of the 5 measurements, i.e.
(l1, l2, l3, l4, l5), and R is the corresponding covariance
matrix, which contains the variances and covariances of the
ﬁve measurements. The three theories stated above can be
translated into models with inequality and equality con-
straints between the measurement means according to:
M1 equality model : l1 ¼ l2 ¼ l3 ¼ l4 ¼ l5
M2 availability model : l1 ¼ l2\l3 ¼ l4 ¼ l5
M3 quantitative model : l1 ¼ l2\l3 ¼ l4\l5
Please note here that model M1 is equivalent to the null
hypothesis, i.e., the perceived position of the subject’s own
hand is based on a speciﬁc relative weighting between
vision and proprioception that is equal across all
conditions. Next, we calculate the Bayes factor of each
model versus the other models. This can be done using the
methodology described by Mulder et al. (2009). Finally,
the posterior model probability of each model can be
calculated using the Bayes factors according to:
pðM1jXÞ¼
Bj1
B11 þ B21 þ B31
ð1Þ
for j = 1, 2, 3, where B11 = 1 because model M1 is equally
good as itself. As was mentioned earlier, the outcome
reﬂects the probability that model Mj is the correct model
among the three models given the data.
The Bayes factors between each of the three models are
displayed in Table 3. From these results it can be con-
cluded that the Quantitative model M3 is the best model
because there is decisive evidence in favor of model M3
against model M1 (B31 = 500) as well as strong evidence
in favor of model M3 against model M2 (B32 = 10).
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(1) and are presented in Table 4. Hence, the Quantitative
model M3 is the most plausible of the three models given
the data, with a posterior model probability of 0.91. This
result implies that the perceived location of the subject’s
own index ﬁnger depends on relative weighting between
(memorized) visual information and proprioceptive infor-
mation, whereby the relative weights depend on the
availability as well as the quantity of new proprioceptive
information. As the subject moves the limb, additional
proprioceptive information about the limb’s location
becomes available, and the relative weight assigned to the
visual information about the limb’s location diminishes.
By approaching the data in this way Example 2 shows
that different sensed locations within a single perceptual
task can be explained by differential weighting of infor-
mation. Approaching the data in this way shifts the focus of
interpretation back onto the interplay between the nature of
the available sensory input and the speciﬁc output
demands, providing more information about how the body
representation is built up. This seems to be more infor-
mative and meaningful than classifying the task depen-
dency of the RHI in terms of different body representation
categories only—categories that differ between different
body representation models in the ﬁrst place.
Conclusion: the weight of representing the body
In the present paper, we address a problem that has
recently arisen: the potentially indeﬁnite number of body
representations in healthy individuals when based on
bodily illusion task-dependency alone. We propose a shift
in focus by looking into how the sensory conﬂict induced
during a bodily illusion is resolved depending on how
different sensory weighting criteria are applied. Further-
more, we suggest identifying different models (either on
the level of multisensory information or on the level of
different theoretical body representation models) and
testing them against each other simultaneously with
Bayesian model selection in a single experiment. This
way, we try to create more consensus and clarity within
the body representations literature in healthy individuals.
We illustrate the technical application of this approach in
two RHI examples.
The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, the lack
of unity between body representation models can now be
overcome by testing these models directly against each
other. The Bayes factor does not give the answer which of
the models is ‘‘the truth’’, but it can tell which of the
models under investigation receives most support from the
data. Second, the risk of inﬁnite multiplication can be
Table 2 Overview of the real
dataset, showing the RHI-
dependent location error in
centimeters (cm) for each
perceptual response (data
previously published in
Kammers et al. 2009a)
Proprioceptive update
(preceded pointing)
Perceptual response
1. none 2. none
(twice left)
3. partial
(left then right)
4. partial
(right then left)
5. maximal
(twice right)
Subject
1 5.46 5.67 3.33 2.67 1.33
2 6.75 5.67 2.00 3.00 0.00
3 5.54 4.67 4.67 2.67 0.00
4 6.83 6.67 3.67 4.00 3.67
5 5.38 4.33 3.67 3.33 3.33
6 4.92 4.00 4.00 3.67 2.00
7 6.25 6.00 3.33 3.33 2.67
8 5.83 4.67 2.00 3.00 2.33
9 5.92 7.17 4.00 4.00 0.67
10 6.13 5.67 3.00 1.33 2.00
11 7.75 5.67 3.67 4.33 4.00
12 5.83 7.00 2.67 3.67 3.50
13 5.75 5.33 3.00 3.33 0.33
14 4.75 4.17 3.67 3.00 1.00
Mean 5.9 5.5 3.3 3.2 1.9
Table 3 Bayes factors between
the constrained models M1, M2,
and M3
B21 50
B31 500
B32 10
Table 4 Posterior model
probabilities
p(M1|X) 0.002
p(M2|X) 0.091
p(M3|X) 0.907
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123avoided by creating models that focus on the input together
with the output, and by testing several different experi-
mental manipulations at the same time against each other.
This investigation of how the body is represented rather
than in how many ways, might lead to more consensus and
less isolated experiments.
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